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Trade Related Investment Measures in the Uruguay
Round: Towards a GATT For Investment?
Edmund M.A. Kwaw*
Introduction
Attempts by host governments to regulate foreign investment
have often created a tension between the principal of national sover-
eignty and the principle of interdependence enshrined in interna-
tional law. This tension has resulted in conflicts between host
governments and multinational enterprises (MNEs). These conflicts
first emerged in the early sixties when newly independent developing
countries found themselves unable to control their natural resources
for economic development because of the absence in international
law of precise rules to govern colonial foreign investment arrange-
ments and to promote the interests of the host developing
countries. I
During this period, developing countries desired rules that
would promote their rapid economic development by guaranteeing a
fair share in the benefits deriving from their association with foreign
enterprises. These nations sought to address the absence of multi-
laterally acceptable standards for the conduct of investment by re-
structuring the framework of international rules governing
international economic relations. 2 Using their majority in the United
* B.A. with honors, Ghana; LL.B with honors, Leeds; LL.M, Queen's; D.Jur. Candi-
date and Sessional Lecturer, Osgoode Hall Law School.
I The principles of customary international law governing investment are derived
from the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens and alien property. These rules,
which evolved as a means of protecting property rights of aliens, subsequently were ex-
panded to foreign companies and firms. The rules thus were concerned primarily with
restricting the ability of host states to interfere with investment and the conditions under
which the home country of the alien could raise a claim under international law for wrong-
ful interference. For a discussion of the nature of the rules governing foreign investment,
see Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
588 (1988); Guha-Roy, Is the Law of Responsibilty of States for Injuries to Aliens Part of the Univer-
sal International Law?, 55 AM.J. INT'L L. 863 (1961). For a detailed discussion on the nature
of colonial investment agreements, see Asante, Restructuring Transnational Mineral Agree-
ments, 73 AM.J. INT'L L. 335 (1979).
2 The Developing Countries called for a Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General
Assembly to discuss the question of raw materials and development. At this Special Ses-
sion the Developing Countries called for the proclamation of a New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO). The means to achieve this NIEO include the formation of producer
cartels, improvement in the terms of trade, and the indexing of developing countries' ex-
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Nations, they asserted their right to permanent sovereignty over nat-
ural resources by invoking their inherent right to regulate invest-
ment and to nationalize alien property in accordance with national
standards. 3 This brought the developing nations into conflict with
the prevailing norms of international law.4
Recently this conflict between the desire of host governments to
regulate foreign investment and the norms of international law has
assumed a different character. The conflict this time is not about the
host governments' right to nationalize alien property in accordance
with national standards, but is about the violation of the principle of
"freer" international trade embodied in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) due to the application of host government
investment measures. Current national regulatory regimes concern-
ing investment and MNE activity have adopted a carrot and stick ap-
proach, combining the use of incentives to attract investors with the
imposition of performance requirements to regulate them. The use
of this strategy to regulate investment must be seen in the context of
the constraints imposed by the international economy and as part of
a general strategy-especially of developing countries-to achieve
the objectives of a new international economic order.5 Improving
the terms and conditions of trade, procuring an export market in
developed countries, regulating and supervising the activities of mul-
tinational enterprises, and obtaining an equitable transfer of technol-
ports to the prices of imports from the developed countries. The Sixth Special Session
adopted the declaration for the establishment of the NIEO. See G.A. Res. 3202, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
3 See The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). For a discussion of the approach
of the developing countries to foreign investment as revealed in the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, see Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States: A Reflection of Rejection of International Law, 9 INT'L LAw. 295 (1975); Weston, The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75
AM.J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
4 Although the basic legal principle relevant to foreign investment is that private
property is subject to the municipal law of the state in which it is situated, the rule is
subject to qualification by the exisiting norms of customary international law. These
norms include: (1) the notion of the minimum international standard, a standard below
which a host state could not go in its treatment of aliens and alien property without incur-
ring responsibility under international law to the state of the foreign property owner (be-
cause the standard with which the host state treated its own nationals could fall below this
international minimum standard, the minimum standard in certain cases could mean supe-
rior treatment); (2) the concept of pact sunt servanda or the sanctity of contract; (3) the
concept of acquired rights which meant that once a right had been conferred on an alien
by a municipal law, it could not be taken away by a subsequent change of the law without
the duty to make reparation; and (4) nationalization and expropriation which must be:
(a) in the public interest, and (b) followed by prompt and adequate compensation. See
Stanford, International Law and Foreign Investment, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF
HUMAN WELFARE 473 (1978); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1969).
5 Kelly, National Treatment and the Formulation of a Code of Conduct for Transnational Cor-
porations, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 139 (F. Pinter ed.
1980).
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ogy are among the objectives of this new international economic
order.6
The question of the regulation of foreign investment, attendant
with the control exercised by host governments over MNEs, has al-
ways been a matter of national policy due to the absence of a multi-
laterally agreed set of principles. The GATT emerged in 1947 as a
provisional arrangement that was applied under the Protocol of Pro-
visional Application in place of the comprehensive International
Trade Organization. The GATT has remained the only agreement
capable of addressing all international trade issues. 7 It is, however,
"a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement,"8 and therefore has not
been concerned directly with foreign investment. Furthermore, the
provisions of the GATT have only been applicable to states. 9
In the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, attempts have
been made to expand the institutional structure of the GATT by link-
ing investment policy with trade policy and to apply the rigors of
GATT to investment measures that are trade-distorting in their ef-
fect. 0 The objective was to create multilateral rules for the liberali-
zation of investment."l The new GATT Round is thus a totally new
6 For a discussion of the objective of the new international order, see E. LAZLO, R.
BAKER, E. EISENBERG, & V. RAMAN, THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (1978); J. HART, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1982).
7 Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 21, 30 (1980).
8 Id.
9 The GATT at its inception was merely the commercial policy of what was to be an
International Trade Organization, which was also to be created simultaneously. It was
essentially a trade barrier regime to govern the trading relationship between its con-
tracting parties and was not to be concerned with investment. It had been intended that
the regulation of the conduct of investment was to come within the provisions of the Char-
ter for the Establishment of the International Trade Organization. See infra note 18 and
accompanying text.
10 The Ministerial Declaration of September 20, 1986, which launched the Uruguay
Round, states: "Trade Related Investment Measures: Following an examination of the op-
eration of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of invest-
ment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may
be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade." URUGUAY ROUND: PAPERS ON SE-
LECTED ISSUES 376 (1989).
11 The conclusion seems to follow from the general liberal economic principles un-
derlying the GATT and the fact that international investment is increasingly becoming
integrated with international trade. See Comford, Some Notes on the Proposed New Interna-
tional Regimes for Foreign Investment and Services, 1 UNCTAD REV. 17 (1989). Another indica-
tion of the objective of the Uruguay Round, as far as TRIMs were concerned, is provided
by the legal extension of the section 301 remedy of the United States to include new areas
such as investment and the scope of the negotiating authority vested in the President of
the United States by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). Section 305 of the Act, which
concerned the President's negotiating authority, vests in the President, among other
things, authority "to reduce or eliminate barriers to foreign direct investment, to expand
the principles of national treatment and to reduce unreasonable barriers to establish-
ment .... . 19 U.S.C. § 2114(a) (Supp. 1990). Section 307 defines international trade as
including "trade in both goods and services and foreign direct investment by United States
persons especially if such investment has implications for trade in goods and services." Id.
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experience in the history of the GATT-MTN process.
Investment regulatory measures that are trade distorting in their
effects are called trade related investment measures (TRIMs). 12
They usually combine the use of incentives with the imposition of
performance obligations in a bid to make MNE conduct meet na-
tional goals.' 3 The use of TRIMs has been opposed because their
use is inimical to the principles of a "freer" international trade and
has the same effect as the use of nontariff barriers. 14
The host countries that use TRIMs, especially the developing
countries, have defended their use on the grounds that they are na-
tional policy measures and that they concern investment regulation,
which is a prerogative of the state and an attribute of permanent sov-
ereignty.15 They have also argued that the use of TRIMs offsets the
problem caused by the lack of a multilaterally agreed set of principles
to regulate the conduct of investment in the manner envisioned by
the Charter for the International Trade Organization.' 6 Thus,
although the Uruguay Round may end without any agreement on the
issue of bringing TRIMs under the GATT, the very examination of
the link between investment policy and trade policy during the round
raises issues pertinent not only to international trade but also to in-
ternational investment. Specifically, it raises the question whether
the present framework of the GATT can be the basis of the much
debated GATT for investment.
It is impossible to examine the issue of trade related investment
measures without considering the fundamental factors that give rise
to their use. This Article will consider the reasons for the use of
TRIMs and conclude that the extension of the GAT-T to TRIMs, in-
volving the creation of multilateral rules for their use, must be ac-
companied by the creation of multilateral rules and standards to
govern MNE investment activity. The Article will then examine the
extent to which the current GATT regulatory framework could serve
at § 2112(g)(3). For the use of the section 301 proceeding in the area of investment, see
Investigation Under Section 301, Semi Conductor Industry Association, 50 Fed. Reg.
28,886 (1985) (initiation); Investigation Under Section 301, Brazil's Information Policy, 50
Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985) (initiation).
12 Fonthein & Gadbaw, Trade Related Performance Requirements Under the GA 7T-MTN Sys-
tem and Under U.S. Law, 14 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 129 (1982). See also Sanfarain, Trade
Related Investment Issues, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's 611 (W. Cline ed. 1983); GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVmES-1989 66 (1990).
13 Puri & Brusick, Trade-Related Investment Measures: Issues for Developing Countries in the
Uruguay Round, in URUGUAY ROUND: PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES (1989). See also GATT
ACTIVITIES, supra note 12, at 67 (on the submissions of India, Malaysia, and Singapore
during the Uruguay Round).
14 See Fonthein & Gadbaw, supra note 12.
15 See Information and Media Relations Division of GATT, Focus: GATT NEWSL. 5-6
(1989). See also Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 209-10; K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, 2 THE
LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER GATT III.C 14-15 (1990).
16 For a discussion of the investment provisions of the Charter for the Establishment
of an ITO see infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
312 [VOL. 16
1 GATT AND INVESTMENT
as the basis for the creation of a general framework of rules for inter-
national investment activity.
I. The Problem of the Regulation of Investment
The first multilateral attempt to develop precise rules to regu-
late the conduct of foreign investment was made in 1947 when an
effort was made to establish an International Trade Organization
under the auspices of the United Nations.17 At the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana from No-
vember 1947 to March 1948, the efforts to adopt a charter' 8 for the
establishment of an International Trade Organization (ITO) failed. 19
The ITO was to be "the third pillar in the institutional structure of
specialized agencies designed to promote post-war economic recon-
struction."120 The other two pillars of this proposed institutional
structure, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), did, how-
ever, stand in place.
Chapter III, article 12, of the proposed Charter for the ITO,
entitled Economic Development and Reconstruction, provided inter
alia:
(1) The members recognize that,
(a) international investment, both public and private, can be of
great value in promoting economic development....
(b) the international flow of capital will be stimulated to the extent thatMembers afford nationals of other countries opportunities for investment and
security for existing and future investments;
(c) without prejudice to existing international agreements to which
Members are parties, a Member has the right:
(i) to take any appropriate safeguards to ensure that foreign invest-
ment is not used as a basis for interference in its internal affairs or
national policies;
(ii) to determine whether and to what extent and upon what terms it will allow
future foreign investment;
(iii) to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to the owner-
ship of existing and future investments;
17 For further analysis and discussion of the background and provisions of the Char-
ter for the Establishment of an ITO, see C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 153-60
(1949); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 3-59 (1990).
18 U.S. Dept. of State Pub. 3206, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organi-
zation (1947) [herinafter Havana Charter].
19 R. HUDEC, supra note 17, at 49; see alsoJ. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYs-
TEM 2 (1990).
20 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMrrATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 1
(1985); J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 2 (the GATT system was part of the broader Bretton
Woods System including the IMF and the IBRD). Although the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence, which established the World Bank and the IMF, did not take up the problems of
international trade, it nevertheless did recognize the need for a comparable institution to
deal with problems of international trade. See U.S. Dept. of State Pub. 2866, Proceedings
and Documents 941, United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference (Bretton Woods,
N.H., July 1-22, 1944) (1948).
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(iv) to prescribe and to give effect to other reasonable requirements with respect
to existing and future investments.21
In attempting to ensure the continued flow of capital for eco-
nomic development, the provisions of article 12 recognized the right
of capital importing nations to control the use of their resources, as
well as the right of the providers of capital to security in their invest-
ment. The Havana Charter did not materialize, however, due to its
failure to attract the required number of ratifications and the refusal
of the United States to agree to submit itself to such a comprehen-
sive body as the ITO.2 2 The failure of the Havana Charter left a void
in the post-war international system for regulating economic rela-
tions. Although some of its provisions were adopted by other inter-
national bodies,2 3 the issue of regulating the conduct of foreign
investors has, since that time, never been multilaterally addressed.
On the bilateral level, the conduct of investment has been gov-
erned by a series of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed be-
tween the United States and some host nations, and bilateral
investment protection agreements (BIPAs) signed between some of
the Western European nations and host countries.2 4 On the interna-
tional level, the conduct of foreign investment has been influenced
by traditional international law standards aimed at providing security
for investment and capital. These standards were inconsistent with
the interests of developing countries who wanted to enjoy perma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources.
The notion of permanent sovereignty was introduced by Chile
into the debate on Human Rights Covenants in the United Nations
in 1952.25 As eventually drafted by the Human Rights Commission,
the Covenant affirmed in article 3:1 that "the right of peoples to self
determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources. In no case may a people be deprived
of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any right that may
21 Havana Charter, supra note 18, ch. III, art. 12 (emphasis added).
22 R. HUDEC, supra note 17, at 51-61;J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 12.
23 The Charter's provisions on economic development formed the basis for the gen-
eralized system of preferences adopted by UNCTAD. UNCTAD, Preferential or Free Entry of
Exports of Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of Devetoping Countries to the Developed Countries,
U.N. Doc. TD/II/RES/21 (1968). The provisions of the Charter relating to restrictive
trade practices were incorporated in UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C.2/54, U.N. Sales No. GE.68-19907 (1968), a report calling for more study on the
question of restrictive business practices adopted by private enterprises of developed
countries. This study ultimately led to the adoption of a multilateral agreement on a non-
binding set of principles for the control of restrictive business practices. See Agreement
Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976,
United States-Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
24 See Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CoR-
NELL INrr'L LJ. 201, 209-10 (1988) (discussing the development and use of the 1983 draft).
25 U.N. Doc. E/CNA/L.24. See O'Keefe, The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources, 8J. WORLD TRADE L. 239 (1974). See also Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. INr'L L. 854 (1956).
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be claimed by other states."'2 6 Although this was the first specific
mention of the idea of permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources, the general idea that the right to self determination had
political as well as economic aspects already had been recognized in
United Nations resolutions. 27
Even prior to recognition by the United Nations, the Latin
American states had come to regard the existing rules of interna-
tional law with respect to state responsibility for injuries to aliens as
an unwarranted and oppressive burden. The most articulate propo-
nent of this Latin American position was Dr. Calvo, the Argentine
diplomat and jurist. Calvo postulated that states, being sovereign,
free, and independent, enjoyed the right of freedom from interfer-
ence by other states, whether such interference be by force or by
diplomacy. He also took the position that aliens were entitled only
to those rights and privileges accorded nationals, and therefore had
to seek redress through national courts. The Latin American coun-
tries also sought to substitute the national treatment standard for the
generally accepted international minimum standard as a yardstick for
measuring state responsibility for injuries to aliens.28 Thus, for the
developing capital-importing countries, the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources was one which invoked the princi-
ple of self-determination, involving political as well as economic
sovereignty.
In 1958, the United Nations General Assembly established a
commission to look into the concept of permanent sovereignty over
natural wealth and resources. The work of this commission
culminated in the adoption of resolution 1803 on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources.2 9 It has been argued that the provi-
sions of resolution 1803 represented an attempt to reach "a
compromise between the capital-importing countries who owned the
natural resources, and the capital-exporting countries who owned
and controlled those resources" by way of contracts and conces-
sions.30 For the developing countries however, the provisions of res-
26 G.A. Res. 545, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
27 Resolution 523 of January 12, 1952, stated that "the under-developed countries
have the right to determine freely the use of their natural resources and that they must
utilize such resources in order to be in a better position to further the realization of their
plans of economic development in accordance with their national interests." G.A. Res.
523, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952). Likewise, Resolution 626 of
December 21, 1952, also stated that "the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their
natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty." G.A. Res. 626, 7 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
28 See Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1-61 (R. Lillich ed.
1983).
29 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
30 LEGAL ASPECTS OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 35 (F. Pinter ed. 1980).
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olution 1803 fell far short of vesting in them control over their
natural resources. Resolution 1803 was written such that foreign in-
vestment, and for that matter the activities of private firms, was not
governed exclusively by municipal law. Moreover, expropriation and
nationalization under the norms of international law could only be
justified on the grounds of public utility, national interest, and secur-
ity. 31 This, to the developing countries, meant the continuation of
foreign domination 32 and control over their resources and the lack
of economic independence. Resolution 1803 was "based upon pecu-
liarly western values for example the inviolability of private prop-
erty," 33 which did not serve the developing countries' interests.
There was thus a "vanishing consensus on the rules of customary
international law on foreign investment,"'3 4 on the part of the devel-
oping countries.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the developing countries sought to
assert their influence in international law by using their majority in
the United Nations to pass resolutions which affirmed the right of
states to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and the
concomitant need to facilitate their rapid economic development
through the establishment of a New International Economic Or-
der.35 In May 1974, the United Nations General Assembly instituted
a Program of Action for the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order3 6 and in December 1974, by resolution 3281, it
adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.3 7 The
scope of the developing countries' enjoyment of permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources, as embodied in these two resolutions,
was broad and included permanent sovereignty over all economic
activities.3 8 The resolutions reached all the profits made by transna-
31 2 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 684 (1984).
32 H. SCHWAMM & D. GERIDIS, CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 5
(1977).
33 Note, Creating a Framework for the Re-Introduction of International Law to Controversies
Over Compensationfor Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COMM. 163,
166 (1981).
34 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1969).
35 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 51,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). The legal and political issues surrounding the developing
country advocacy for a New International Economic Order have been well documented in
the literature. See, e.g., Brower & Tepe, supra note 3; Weston, supra note 3; LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (F. Pinter ed. 1980); The Objectives of the
New International Order, Programme of Achin in the Establishment of a New Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3202, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
36 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
37 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 51, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
38 Resolution 3201 in part affirmed the right of every state to
full permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and all economic activities.
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tional corporations, and also allowed developing countries to influ-
ence the production and pricing of natural resources as a specific
attribute of the sovereign right of the state. As Dr. Ibrahim Shihata
wrote:
[N]othing in the present system of international law prevents a pro-
ducing country from selling its primary products at whatever prices
it chooses to fix. Indeed, the right of every country to freely dispose
of its natural wealth is an integral part of the universally acknowl-
edged principle that a state possesses sovereignty over all its natural
resources.
3 9
The opposition of the developing countries to the norms of in-
ternational law has been seen as the result of certain failures on the
part of the international community.40 Specifically, international
law, the industrialized countries, and their multinationals failed to
develop principles, institutions, and procedures that would allocate
to the developing countries exporting raw materials an equitable
share of the benefits of investment.4' In recent times, however, the
desire of the developing countries to guard permanent sovereignty
has been partially eclipsed by their desire to attract foreign invest-
ment for economic development. The predominant desire of the
1970s to expropriate and nationalize foreign investment 42 seems to
have given way to the desire to attract investors and to control and
regulate their activities through the use of trade related investment
measures.
A. TRIMs and Host Government Regulation of Investment
Investment measures that are used by countries to obtain opti-
mum benefits from the investment relationship and that have an ef-
fect on trade are TRIMs. Fontheim and Gadbawr 43 define TRIMs as
investment measures that are "intended to promote trade policy
objectives."'44 This definition suggests that the use of TRIMs by cap-
ital importing nations, and developing countries in particular, is only
In order to safeguard these resources, each state is entitled to exercise effec-
tive control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own
situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership to its
nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of
the state.
G.A. Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) (emphasis
added).
39 Shihata, Arab Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. Nrr'L L.
261, 268 (1976).
40 Raman, Transnational Corporations, International Law and the New International Economic
Order, 6 SvYAcusEJ. INT'L L. & COMM. 17, 47 (1978).
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (Int'l Arbitral Tribu-
nal 1978).
4s Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade Related Performance Requirements Under the GATT-MTN
System and U.S. Law, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 129 (1982) (hereinafter Fontheim). See also
Sanfarain, Trade Related Investment Issues, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's 611 (1983).
44 Fonthein, supra note 43 at 130.
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aimed at enhancing the international trading objectives of the user
countries. This is, however, an over-simplification of reality. The
rationale for the use of TRIMs must not be completely dissociated
from the general economic situation of the developing countries.
TRIMs may take a variety of forms including export require-
ments, product mandating requirements, local content require-
ments, trade balancing requirements, and incentives, which are
discussed below. TRIMs usually involve a combination of incentives
to attract investors and performance requirements, 45 which require
the MNE to perform certain activities that contribute to national pol-
icy objectives. While the use of TRIMs may be aimed at the mere
control of investment in the case of a developed country, in the case
of the developing countries the overriding objective is the promo-
tion 46 of development. An equitable consideration in the imposition
of TRIMs involves the ability to use TRIMs to control the MNE's
market power and anticompetitive activities, both of which are detri-
mental to development. 47
TRIMs may be imposed at entry as conditional entry require-
ments, or they may be imposed as operational requirements. 48 For
various reasons, TRIMs are usually imposed at entry.49 First, their
use at entry leaves open the option of introducing additional require-
ments after entry, as they are needed. Furthermore, the use of a con-
ditional entry requirement operates to bestow on the host country
significant bargaining power. The host country may decide to allow
entry or to refuse entry. At that point in time it also deals with the
parent company, enabling it to influence the subsequent operational
strategy of the parent company with respect to the proposed
subsidiary.
Because the host country initially retains the option of refusing
or allowing entry, it may decide to allow entry only when certain con-
ditions are met. In this way it can introduce into the relationship
45 Sometimes the term "trade related investment measures" (TRIMs) is used synony-
mously with "trade related performance requirements" (TRPR). Although both terms
may refer to host government investment measures, they are actually different in scope.
"TRIM" embraces the whole array of investment measures that impact trade (both per-
formance requirements and investment incentives), but "TRPR" only refers to the use of
performance requirements.
46 See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATF AcTivrrIEs IN 1989 67
(1990) (citing submissions by India, Malaysia, and Singapore stating that "the develop-
ment dimensions of certain investment measures far outreach their trade effects and that
they are needed to counter the restrictive business practices of multinationals").
47 Sanfarain, Trade Related Investment Issues, supra note 43, at 611 (TRIMs "are often
part of a larger set [of measures] aimed at providing a fiscal, monetary and regulatory
framework for multinational enterprises").
48 C. WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 41-43 (1983)
(drawing the distinction between investment measures imposed at entry as a condition of
entry (conditional entry requirements) and those imposed later during actual operation of
the investor (operational requirements)).
49 Id.
[VOL. 16
GATT AND INVESTMENT
with the foreign enterprise certain measures that influence the loca-
tion of facilities in economically depressed areas or other designated
areas. The host country also can exact conditions such as export
performance, local equity participation, the presence of nationals on
the board of directors, procurement of services, or any other condi-
tions favorable to the host country.50 The objective is obviously to
achieve certain nationally determined standards of economic
development.
1. Export Requirements
Export requirements usually oblige the investor to export a cer-
tain fixed quantity of its total production. 5' They can also take the
form of product mandating requirements, in which the investor is
required to earmark certain products for export or to export specific
products to specific countries. Another type of export requirement
is the trade balancing requirement. 52 If an investor imports inputs
using scarce foreign exchange, the imposition of a trade balancing
requirement can oblige the investor to offset the imports with ex-
ports. Where this results in more production than would otherwise
be the case, it becomes an export requirement.
2. Local Content Requirements
Local content requirements mandate the use of local supplies,
raw materials, and services as a percentage of local value added to
the investor's final product.5 3 They can also require that the investor
set up local facilities.54
3. Investment Incentives
TRIMs also include the use of incentives. Investment incentives
take various forms, the object being to attract the investor by the
prospect of increased profitability. Typical incentives take the form
of tax holidays, tax ceilings, and subsidies granted to the investor.
50 Id. at 43.
51 Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 213; see also K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15,
at 69.
52 Pur & Brusick, supra note 13, at 213-14; see also K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note
15, at 69.
53 Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 214; see also K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15,
at 69.
54 An example of such a local content requirement would be the requirement under
the erstwhile Foreign Investment Review Act of Canada that prospective investors submit
written purchase undertakings including "best efforts to use Canadian sources of supply, a
percentage or amount of purchase of Canadian products, the replacement of exports with
Canadian made goods in specific dollar amounts, the commitment to set up a purchasing
division in the Canadian subsidiary." See generally Canada-Administration of the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act, 30 GATT BISD Supp. 143, GATT Doc. L/5504 (1983).
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The effect of the use of incentives is to raise the profitability of the
firm and hence its competitive position.
4. Transfer of Technology Requirements
Transfer of technology requirements also may take a variety of
forms. The host government may stipulate the kind of technology to
be introduced into the country, or it may require the investor to li-
cense the technology involved in the investment to locals. The Draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology55 de-
fines the transfer of technology to include "the transfer of systematic
knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a
process or for rendering of a service and does not extend to the
transactions involving the mere sale or mere lease of goods."156
Transfer of technology requirements thus embrace the whole ar-
ray of transactions involving the use of technology by an investor in a
host country. These include the provision of know-how and techni-
cal expertise; the provision of technological knowledge necessary for
the installation, operation, and functioning of plants, equipment,
and turn-key projects; the provision of technological knowledge nec-
essary to acquire, install, and use machines, equipment, intermediate
goods, and raw materials that are acquired by purchase, lease, or
other means; and the provision of technological contents of indus-
trial and technical cooperation arrangements. 57
The use of the investment regulatory measures discussed above,
although aimed at the promotion of the development of host states,
is inconsistent with the goal of a "freer" international trade as em-
bodied in the GAIT framework of rules. This inconsistency is the
result of the link between investment policy and trade policy, which
has in recent times been enhanced by the important role played by
the MNE in international trade.58
B. The Link Between Trade Policy and Investment Policy
The link between trade policy and investment policy is a func-
tion of the change in the structure of international trade, character-
ized by the internationalization of production by the MNE, in an
attempt to avoid the imperfections of the market.59 It is argued that
55 U.N. CONFERENCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOL-
OGY, U.N. Doc. TD/Code TOT/25, U.N. Sales No. GE.80-53826 (1980).
56 Id. at 3.
57 Id. at 4.
58 For discussion on the increased role of the MNE in international trade, see The
Process of Transnationalization in the 1980's, 26 C.T.C. REP. 5 (1988); Dunning, Trade, Location
of Economic Activity and the MNE: A Search for an Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL
ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC AcTIvrrY 395-419 (1977); see also J. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1981).
59 For an economic interpretation of the rationale for the international production
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because the MNE has become the primary vehicle for international
trade, the distinction between trade and capital flows has been
blurred due to the ability of the MNE to internalize markets across
national boundaries. 6°
Because direct foreign investment consists of producing in a for-
eign location for export, or as a substitute for imports, MNEs are
very important for the trade flows of both home and host govern-
ments. Existing data indicate that international trade associated with
MNEs accounts for 80% to 90% of the exports of the United States
and the United Kingdom.6 1 This implies that MNEs are important
marketing channels. A significant portion of this MNE trade is intra-
firm trade.62
Although the multinational enterprise has altered the orthodox
framework of international trade by its internalization of production,
the existence of the MNE, and the role it plays in international trade,
does not per se contradict the liberal economic premises at the basis
of the GATT system. This is because in the process of internalizing
production, the multinational enterprise responds to the differences
in cost and profitability at each step in the production process.63
Each production step occurs at the location most favorable to the
multinational enterprise in terms of cost efficiency64 because com-
parative advantages are relatively fixed in the resource base of a
country. Therefore, according to liberal economic principles, MNEs
in free competition will more effectively allocate world resources
than would be the case if governments interfered in their activities.
As McCulloch and Owen write:
In recent times, . . multinational corporations have become a pri-
mary vehicle for the internalization of production .... In a world
without trade barriers or other distortions, the process of internal-
ization would imply not only that each good is produced at the loca-
tion offering lowest costs, but that each step in its production is
located so as to minimize overall costs of servicing a particular
market.6 5
activities of the multinational enterprise, see Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic Activity
and The MNE: A Search For an Eclectic Approach, supra note 58, at 395; J. DUNNING, INTERNA-
TIONAL PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 29 (1981).
60 Id. The process of internalizing markets across national boundaries refers to the
process where the MNE prefers to carry out transactions within the firm at a lower cost
than through the market. Internalization involves the use of integration strategies and the
centralized coordination of the production and financial activities of the MNE. For a dis-
cussion of the rationale behind the internalization of markets by the MNE, see N. HOOD &
S. YOUNG, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 54-55 (1979).
61 The Process of Transationalisation in the 1980's, 26 C.T.C. REP. 5 (1988).
62 Id.
63 McCulloch & Owen, Linking Negotiations on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE 1980's 343 (C. Kindleberger & D. Audretsch 1983).
64 See, e.g., N. HOOD & S. YOUNG, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
50-55 (1979).
65 McCulloch & Owen, supra note 63, at 343.
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Consistent with this approach is the fact that the GATT does not
require that governments supervise or regulate the activities of the
multinational enterprise. The imposition of TRIMs on the MNE
thus has the same effect as tariff barriers, because they seek to influ-
ence the locational decisions of the multinational enterprise by creat-
ing comparative advantages by artificial means. Because GATF
draws a distinction between two kinds of trade barriers-tariffs and
nontariff barriers-and only permits the use of tariffs, any other mea-
sure that has an analogous trade restrictive effect falls within the lat-
ter category and is inconsistent with the General Agreement. Local
content requirements, for example, oblige the investor to procure
local inputs, compelling the MNE to purchase from indigenous inef-
ficient producers at the expense of efficient production. 66
The link between international trade and investment and do-
mestic trade and investment policies reveals the inadequacy of the
rules of the GATT in dealing with host government regulatory meas-
ures. The inadequacy of the GATT rules is due to the discrepancy
between their limited coverage and the present scope and structure
of international trade. One response to the changing structure of
international trade has been the attempt in the Uruguay Round to
link trade policy with investment policy, and to provide multilateral
rules for the use of TRIMs. This seems to suggest that the drive to
include investment under the GATT is intended to remove only the
trade distorting aspects of TRIMs. Although this may be the inter-
pretation suggested by the ministerial declaration of the Uruguay
Round, 67 the negotiations became a conflict between those con-
tracting parties who wanted a broad interpretation of TRIMs, includ-
ing generic investment measures in general, which implies the
facilitation of investment,68 and those contracting parties who fa-
vored a restricted interpretation.
II. The Uruguay Round Negotiations
In 1986, the Uruguay Round of GAIT negotiations was success-
fully launched at Punta del Este. The Ministerial Declaration at
Punta del Este, which launched the Uruguay Round, was a compro-
mise between the contracting parties-such as the United States-
who wanted to include more generic investment measures under the
GATT and those who wanted to restrict the jurisdiction of the GATT
only to those measures that have a directly distorting effect on inter-
national trade. The declaration therefore envisaged the examination
of the operation of GATT articles in a number of new areas, includ-
66 Fontheim & Gadbaw, supra note 12, at 135.
67 See supra note 10.
68 See Cornford, Some Notes on Proposed New International Regimes for Foreign Investment
and Services, 1 UNCTAD REV. 19, 21 (1989); Pur & Brusick, supra note 13, at 207-08.
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ing those related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of in-
vestment measures. This declaration implied two things: (1) an
initial characterization of those measures which properly could be
called TRIMs, and (2) the examination of the consistency of these
measures with the provisions of the GATT.69
The lack of consensus on the direction to be taken was the result
of the difficulty of distinguishing between generic investment meas-
ures, which are legitimate per se, and those which need to be subject
to some multilateral discipline because of their trade distorting abil-
ity. Thus, in the initial stages of the negotiations, the list of meas-
ures submitted for consideration seemed to transcend the primary
focus on the trade impact and were more concerned with investment
per se. The specific measures included, on the one hand, those gen-
erally regarded as being inconsistent with the GATT, such as local
content requirements, export performance requirements, trade bal-
ancing requirements, technology transfer requirements, domestic
sales requirements, manufacturing requirements or restrictions,
product mandating and investment incentives and, on the other
hand, those generally regarded as being more generic investment is-
sues, such as foreign exchange and remittance restrictions and local
equity requirements. 70
The lack of consensus evident in the Ministerial Declaration at
Punta del Este was not without cause. The term "trade related in-
vestment measures" is too broad and vague to help in differentiating
the two categories of investment measures. The very idea of "invest-
ment measures" qualified by "trade related," captures the whole ru-
bric of investment measures adopted by host governments. As
Fatouros aptly writes, "it is hard to imagine any measure applied to
investment which is not in some way and to some extent related to
trade."'' T This follows from the fact that the investor in the process
of production responds to differentials in comparative cost advan-
tage. Any measure imposed on the multinational investor is there-
fore likely to influence the decisions of the investor and will thus
have some relationship with or effect on trade.
The FIRA panel, which first considered the applicability of the
GATT to investment measures, expressly pointed out that the only
question it was concerned with was the consistency of the administra-
tion of the Foreign Investment Review Act with Canada's obligations
69 See supra note 10.
70 S. RUBIN & M. JONES, CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN U.S.-E.C. TRADE RELATIONS AT
THE OPENING OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 292 (1989).
71 Fatouros, Possible Standards for Trade Related Investment Measures, in Technology, Trade
Policy and the Uruguay Round, UNCTAD/ITP/23 (1990) (papers and proceedings of a round
table conference held in Delphi, Greece, 1989).
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under the GATT. 72 According to the panel, the GATT did not pre-
vent Canada from exercising its sovereign right to regulate foreign
investment. 73 The FIRA panel thus did not rule out the possibility
that any other regulation, if proven to have some relationship with
trade, can also be brought under the GATT. Because all investment
measures have some relationship with trade, all investment measures
are amenable to the GATT disciplines.
This broad method of categorizing trade related investment
measures is evident in the recent National Trade Estimate Report on For-
eign Trade Barriers74 of the United States. The report "classifies trade
barriers into eight different categories covering government im-
posed measures and policies which restrict, prevent and impede the
international exchange of goods and services."' 75 Among other trade
barriers, the report includes investment barriers such as "limitations
on foreign equity participation, local content and export perform-
ance requirements, and restrictions on transferring earnings and
capital."' 76 The true scope of what the report considers to be an in-
vestment barrier is revealed in the discussion of individual country
measures.
With regard to Australia, the report lists as investment barriers:
the requirement of approval by the Foreign Investment Board for
investment in certain sectors such as the media, civil aviation, and
residential real estate; the requirement of 50% local equity in mining
where the investment exceeded A$10 million except where Austra-
lian capital was unavailable; the imposition of an 85% local content
requirement for passenger vehicles produced in Australia; and the
limitation of foreign advertisements on television to 20% of total ad-
vertisements, excluding advertisements from New Zealand. 77
Concerning India, the report stresses that "India's complex and
comprehensive web of market access barriers is a serious and long
standing impediment to U.S. exports."78 With respect to investment
barriers, the report states that the government of India adopts poli-
cies that severely restrict potential U.S. investment and impose oner-
ous conditions on U.S. firms that do invest in India. 79 It lists as
investment barriers: the restriction of investment in core sectors
aimed at serving national goals; the process of screening by the For-
eign Investment Board; foreign equity participation restrictions of
72 Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504, 30
GATT BISD Supp. 140, 157 (1986) [hereinafter FIRA Panel Report].
73 Id.
74 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (1990).
75 Id. at 1.
76 Id. at 2.
77 Id. at 12-13.
78 Id. at 87.
79 Id. at 92.
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up to 40%; and the imposition of export and local content require-
ments, sometimes as high as 75%.80 It should be noted that this
broad approach can also be seen in the bilateral investment treaty
program of the United States.81
The broad method of characterizing TRIMs was opposed by
some members of the negotiating group for various reasons. First,
opponents were concerned that such a broad interpretation would
invalidate investment measures that may have taken years to create
and perfect, sometimes with the assistance of international agen-
cies.8 2 Second, such a broad interpretation broke with widely ac-
cepted legal precedent because, for example, the international
legality of foreign exchange controls (apart from any obligations
under the articles of the IMF) had long been accepted as an exercise
of national sovereignty over monetary matters.83 Third, the argu-
ment against local equity requirements seemed unjustified because it
implied the acceptance of the view that foreign businesses tend to
import more than local ones. Finally, with regard to technology
transfer regulations, the very fact that the United Nations was negoti-
ating a related code of conduct suggested to these members of the
negotiating group that their use was internationally acceptable.8 4
Due to this diversity of views, the proposals on disciplines for
TRIMs contained three approaches. These were the prohibition ap-
proach of the United States, Japan, and Switzerland, the moderate
approach of the EEC and Nordic countries, and the anti-prohibition
approach of the developing countries. 85
A. The Prohibition Approach to TRIM Disciplines
1. The U.S. Proposal
The United States' proposal on disciplines for TRIMs involved
outright prohibition. According to the U.S. view, the GATT already
covered the use of TRIMs. 86 All that was necessary was to make the
rules more explicit to address individual TRIMs or groups of
80 Id. at 92-93.
81 Article II of the 1983 Draft Bilateral Investment Treaty of the United States enti-
tled "Treatment of Investment" includes (1) the right to MFN and national treatment with
respect to establishing investment; (2) the right to MFN and national treatment with re-
spect to investment once established; (3) the right to certain absolute standards of treat-
ment of investment; (4) the right of entry of aliens in connection with investment and for
investors to select top managerial personnel; and (5) prohibition of certain performance
requirements.
82 Fatouros, supra note 71.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 208-10.
86 According to the United States, the GATT provisions which were applicable to
TRIMs and needed to be examined in detail were articles I, II, III, VI, XI, XV, XVI, XVII,
XVIII, and XXII. See Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 208-10.
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TRIMs.8 7 Such disciplines would be aimed at a more explicit cover-
age of TRIMs by the GATT rules. They could include a prohibited
category with respect to TRIMs that inherently produced adverse ef-
fects and other disciplines for those TRIMs that did not always cause
adverse trade effects. 88 This second category of disciplines could in-
clude a commitment to apply TRIMs in a nondiscriminatory manner,
in accordance with the principles of the GATT.
The justification for the proposal that some TRIMs be prohib-
ited was based on the fact that prohibition is implied in certain
GATT provisions, such as articles I, II, XI, and XVI. Under the U.S.
view, the use of TRIMs inconsistent with those GATT articles should
be prohibited. The United States also called for arrangements that
would ensure a transition to the establishment of effective disciplines
against TRIMs. This implied the need for a gradual phasing in of
disciplines. The United States added that considerations of develop-
ment that had been raised by some participants could only be consid-
ered after effective disciplines on TRIMs had been established.8 9
2. The Swiss Proposal
The Swiss proposal involved three categories of disciplines for
TRIMs: "a prohibited category, a permitted category and an actiona-
ble category." 90 The proposal emphasized that the determination of
which investment measures would fall into the first two categories
depended on (1) whether they affected the behavior of the MNE,
where affecting the behavior of the MNE was defined as compelling it
to act contrary to its determination of comparative cost advantage
and efficiency, or (2) whether they were more concerned with the
generic investment decisionmaking of the host country.
The first category apparently seeks to embrace measures such as
trade balancing requirements and local content requirements, which
influence the locational decisions of the firms. If placed in this first
category, such measures would be deemed to be trade distorting and
would therefore be prohibited. The second category appears to em-
brace measures that are generally perceived as being acceptable in-
vestment regulation, such as local equity requirements. All measures
placed in the second category would be permitted.
Due to a lack of consensus as to which measures constituted
TRIMs, the Swiss proposal provided that where no agreement could
be reached on the categorization of an investment measure, it would
fall into the actionable category. In such a case, the burden would be
on a contracting party to make a complaint. Where the complaint
87 Id. at 207.
88 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 69 n.166.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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was found to be justified, the measure would be subject to the use of
countermeasures.
3. The Japanese Proposal
The Japanese proposal on disciplines for TRIMs involved a
methodology to facilitate the examination of the effects of certain
investment measures. 9' This involved the classification of the invest-
ment measures as definitely inconsistent with the GATT disciplines
or as relevant to its provisions, though not inconsistent. Japan, like
the United States, was of the opinion that the TRIMs negotiations
should result in the creation of new provisions under the GATT for
TRIMs. 92 Thus, Japan proposed that the contracting parties agree
to prohibit those TRIMs that were clearly inconsistent with the
GATT and to formulate provisions to abolish them. 93 With respect
to the second category of measures, which although not inconsistent
with the GATT disciplines were nevertheless relevant to its provi-
sions, it was proposed that better means be elaborated for avoiding
trade distorting and restrictive effects.94
B. The Moderate Approach Concerning Disciplines for TRIMs
1. The Proposal of the Nordic Countries
The Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden, adopted a moderate approach, focusing on measures that
have a direct restrictive effect on international trade and that can be
linked directly to the GATT disciplines. 95 They singled out export
requirements and local content requirements as being the two in-
vestment measures fitting this category. 96 They opposed the right of
establishment 97 and the transfer of resources through negotiations.
According to the Nordic countries' approach, the GATT articles rel-
evant to TRIMs are: article III (national treatment), article VI (the
possibility that export requirements may result in dumping), article
X (the possibility that local content requirements may have effects
similar to as import restrictions), and article XVI (the possibility that
export requirements may lead to subsidization). 98
91 Pur & Brusick, supra note 13, at 208.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 The idea of the right of establishment is linked to the concept of a free trade area.
It generally involves the right of the members of that particular free trade area to enter
with the purpose of investing or establishing and operating businesses in that particular
jurisdiction. Where the right of establishment exists, there are very few restrictions on the
entry and operation of firms by non-nationals.
98 Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 208.
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2. The EEC Proposal
The EEC proposal sought to draw a distinction between the is-
sue of foreign investment and the issue of TRIMs. The proposal
maintained that only measures directly related to trade were rele-
vant. Such measures are those directed at the exports and imports of
firms, with the immediate objective of influencing such firms' trading
patterns. 99 Directly trade related measures include local content re-
quirements, trade balancing requirements, product mandating re-
quirements, export requirements, manufacturing requirements,
domestic sales requirements, and manufacturing limitations con-
cerning components of final products.' 00 The EEC thus was op-
posed to the attempt to extend the GATT disciplines to more
generic investment issues.' 0 ' As one commentator observed:
[TRIMs] were included in the Punta del Este Declaration as a com-
promise after persistent U.S. efforts to include more generic invest-
ment issues in the new Round .... [I]n our opinion the negotiators
should stick to what was agreed at Punta del Este, namely to negoti-
ate improved or new GATT provisions regarding trade related invest-
ment measures .... We do have our doubts however, regarding the
extent to which the GATr can and should approach such generic
investment issues across the board. 10 2
C. The Developing Country Approach
Although the developing countries could be seen as united in
their rejection of a general discipline of prohibition, and in their de-
sire for the negotiations to consider the motives behind the use of
TRIMs, they have not been united with respect to specific tactics and
questions of implementation. A group of eleven developing coun-
tries, including Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, China, and India, ar-
gued that the existing provisions of the GAT were adequate to
cover TRIMs, so there was no need for any new regime.10 3 This sug-
gestion was not supported by the majority of the Newly Industrial-
ized Countries (NICs)-those of the Association of South East Asian
Nations and other countries such as Mexico and South Korea.
The developing countries initially argued en bloc that the nego-
tiating group should focus on those investment measures whose ad-
verse trade effects are direct and significant. These include local
content requirements, export requirements, and trade balancing re-
quirements. According to this view, measures like local equity re-
quirements, remittance restrictions, exchange restrictions,
99 Id. at 209.
100 Id.
101 Mogens, US-EC Industrial Sector Trade Disputes and Trade Related Investment Measures in
the Uruguay Round: The EC Viewpoint, in S. RUBIN & M. JONES, supra note 70, at 257, 262.
102 Id.
103 Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 209.
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investment incentives, licensing requirements, and transfer of tech-
nology requirements have no adverse trade effects and are imposed
to meet objectives which are not related to trade.' °4 This being the
case, a discipline of prohibition is totally inappropriate, as it would
intrude into the province of national investment regulation and
would preclude consideration of the issue of development, which is
an integral part of the use of investment measures. 10 5
The developing countries argued that certain performance re-
quirements were intended to "channel foreign investment according
to ... national development policy objectives,"' 0 6 and that this had
become a necessity because of the imperfect international trading
system caused by the strategies of the MNE. 10 7 They also argued
that, if TRIMs are trade distorting and must be brought under the
GATT, then the trade distorting aspects of MNE business strategies
and restrictive business practices must also be examined.' 08
The general approach of the developing countries, rejecting the
prohibition of TRIMs under the GATT, is the result of what they
perceive to be the disadvantages of a liberalization of investment.10 9
For the developing countries, the issue at stake concerns the extent
to which a free trade in investment will promote growth and develop-
ment. Their fear is that a liberalization of investment, based on the
existing structures of the international economic order, will not pro-
mote growth, but will crystallize the existing imbalances between the
developed industrialized countries and the developing countries.
This fear of the developing countries is justified in light of the nature
of the liberal international economic system.
III. Free Trade in Investment and the Liberal International Economic
System
Trade related investment measures are first and foremost invest-
ment measures, and the arguments and rules for a liberalization of
trade in goods are generally not applicable to factor flows. While the
argument for the liberalization of trade in goods is based on the
principle of comparative advantage as embodied in the orthodox
theory of international trade, the theoretical assumptions in that ap-
proach do not apply to the area of investment, where many qualifica-
tions exist. Thus, to argue for the liberalization of investment
104 See Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 209; see also The Submission of India and Mexico, 66
Focus: GAIT NEWSLETTER 5-6 (1989).
105 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at III.C. 14-25.
106 Puri & Brusick, supra note 13, at 209.
107 GATT ACTIVrIES IN 1989 67 (1990) (citing submissions by India, Malaysia, and
Singapore).
108 Id.
109 Id.
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merely on those grounds is unrealistic, if not an argument directed at
men of straw. As Grey writes:
[The model of international trade on which the GATT is based] ab-
stracts from the reality of private economic power; it ignores the dif-
ferences in power and control of markets as between private entities
engaging in international transactions. The model also abstracts
from differences in the modes of production and their influence on
market behavior .... [D]iscussion of trade policy ... seems to as-
sume that the simplified teaching device embodied in the notion of
comparative advantage says all that there is important to say about
trade policy. ' 10
Although the multinational enterprise in the process of interna-
tional production responds to differences in profitability and com-
parative cost advantages, revealing a link between international trade
and international investment, the conclusion that the MNE's activi-
ties are compatible with the objectives of the liberal international
economic system is not based on reality. The objective of the liberal
economic system is the facilitation of undistorted competition
through an apparatus of decision making that is concealed beneath
the surface of the market system."'l The activities of the MNE in the
process of international production, however, are characterized by
"arrangements which fall outside the normal supply-demand nexus
of partners trading at arms length." '" 2
Hawkins and Walter'I3 give an account of the MNE activities
that deviate from the normal supply and demand premises of liberal
economic principles. These include the practice of bundling,
whereby "various components of the [MNE] package (such as tech-
nology) associated with a high monopoly element, are supplied only
in combination with other parts of the package for which alternative
cheaper sources of supply are available,""14 and the use of the
MNE's "market power [to] serve as an effective barrier to the entry of
competitors lacking the [MNE's] advantages."' 15 Other MNE activi-
ties that may deviate from the normal demand and supply principles
involve the use of integration and centralized control methods." 16
110 Grey, The Decay of the Trade Relations System, in ISSUES IN WORLD TRADE POLICY:
GAT[ AT THE CROSSROADS 17, 20 (1986).
111 Rotstein, The Multinational Corporation in the Political Economy: A Matter of National
Survival, in NATIONALISM AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND
MANAGERIAL ASPECTS 184 (1973).
112 Id. at 185.
113 Hawkins & Ingo, The Multinational Corporation, in CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 159 (1979).
114 Id. at 175.
115 Id.
116 The objective behind the adoption of such strategies involving the centralized and
integrated control over production, research and development, finance, and marketing is
the need of the MNE to achieve competitive advantage. See C. PRALAHAD & Y. Doz, THE
MULTINATIONAL MISSION (1987); Y. Doz, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN MULTINATIONAL COM-
PANIES (1972).
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An integrated strategy involves transcending national markets in de-
termining pricing strategies, financing, and sourcing patterns. The
ultimate effect of integrated strategies is pervasive market power for
the MNE, allowing it to influence decision making in the market.
The use of these strategies necessarily interferes with the free play of
competition and the improved allocation of resources, which is the
objective of the liberal international economic system.
The activities of the multinational enterprise thus skew the ben-
efits of the international trading and production system against the
least powerful in the international economy, i.e. the developing
countries.11 7 As Malcom Gillis I 18 argues, government interference
in the activities of the MNE, and in international trade and invest-
ment for that matter, may just be an attempt to rectify a situation of
imperfect competition caused by the MNE."1 9 McCulloch and
Owen, 120 who have previously argued that TRIMs are nontariff bar-
riers which should be brought under the GAT-, 12 1 concede that
TRIMs are justified by "serious economic arguments."' 122 Accord-
ingly, they write that:
[E]xperts agree that the existence of foreign investment virtually re-
quires significant departures from conditions approximating perfect
competition. Accordingly, standard neoclassical analysis favouring
non-intervention on economic efficiency grounds do not apply.
Host country measures to regulate direct foreign investment fall into
two somewhat overlapping categories intended to correct two dis-
tinct types of market imperfection: market power and externalities in
production. ' 23
In light of the above, the argument of some contracting parties
that the only relevant consideration for the negotiations is whether
the investment measure violates the spirit of GATT and has an effect
on trade is erroneous. Such an approach ignores the considerations
that go into the use of TRIMs, especially in the case of a developing
country. As Whalley12 4 argues, the economic policy and decision
making in developing countries cannot be compartmentalized into
"a GATT for trade, the IMF and World Bank for financial issues and
a Paris Club for Debt,"' 25 because each economic policy is a re-
117 See Helleiner, World Ma'ket Imperfections and the Developing Countries, in POLICY ALTER-
NATIVES FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 357, 383 (Praeger 1979).
118 Gillis, Multinational Corporations and a Liberal International Economic Order: Some Over-
looked Considerations, in CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (R.
Amacher, G. Haberler, & T. Willet ed. 1979).
119 Id. at 204.
120 McCulloch & Owen, supra note 63, at 334.
121 Id. at 347.
122 Id. at 336.
123 Id.
124 J. WHALLEY, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE FORD
FOUNDATION SUPPORTED PROJECT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYS-
TEM (1989).
125 Id. at 47.
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sponse to other constraints. This is the issue at stake for the devel-
oping countries.
It would be difficult for the developing countries to agree to dis-
mantle the use of TRIMs if there is no guarantee that a better frame-
work of rules will replace them. The objective of any negotiations
must be to promote development along with the liberalization of in-
vestment. Merely to bring down the barriers to investment, without
creating a multilaterally agreed set of principles to regulate the con-
duct of international trade and investment, will be detrimental to the
developing countries, the least powerful actors in the international
economy. This has been the thrust of the criticism by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) of the
Uruguay Round of negotiations. 126 According to UNCTAD, the ne-
gotiations must focus upon the promotion of economic development
as well as on the liberalization of investment. 127
The suggestion of UNCTAD and the developing countries is
that if investment measures are to be included in the GATT, it is also
imperative to extend the GATT to the conduct of investment in gen-
eral and to adopt multilaterally agreed standards for the conduct of
investment. There is a need for the "macroscopic perspective,"'' 28
which informs the GATT, to be replaced by a "microscopic perspec-
tive,"' 29 which takes into consideration not only the activities of
states, but also those of the multinational enterprises. The question
that remains is whether the rules of the GAT can be a suitable
framework for the creation of a multilaterally agreed set of principles
to govern the conduct of international trade and investment and to
ensure the efficient allocation of global wealth. This is the subject
matter of the next section.
IV. Toward the Formulation of a Standard for the Multilateral
Regulation of Investment
The argument advanced by the developing countries is that the
GATT, in extending its principles to investment, should consider the
fact that the MNE, by thwarting competition,' 30 frustrates the GAIT
goal of an efficient allocation of resources. The effects of MNE activ-
ity should be considered because the extension of the GATT to in-
vestment may facilitate the anticompetitive behavior of the MNE.
126 Revitalising Development Growth and International Trade: Assessment and Policy Options,
Report to UNCTAD ViI at 157, UNCTAD TD/238/Rev. 1.
127 Id. See also K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15 (discussing the UNCTAD critique
of the Uruguay Round negotiations; observe that the preference of UNCTAD would be for
GATT to provide a level playing field instead of attempting to modify or amend the rules
of the game).
128 F. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 8 (1973).
129 Id. at 9.
130 See, e.g., Gillis, supra note 118, at 204 (the MNE in reality may impede competition
and thus violate the principles of the liberal economic order).
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Although the basic principles of the GATT, such as the principle of
non-discrimination, can be made applicable to the investment activ-
ity of the multinational enterprise, the flaw in the GATT framework
is that its rules and principles are restricted to impediments to com-
petitive international trade created by governments and states.
Thus, the GATT does not possess an antitrust policy in the sense of
a competition policy regulating the use of private economic power.
The liberalization of investment and antitrust regulation are,
however, based on the same rationale, which is that a free and unre-
strained market system should be preserved. Furthermore, a GATT
antitrust policy would promote the effectiveness of the liberalization
of investment by eliminating the impediments to international trade
created by the MNE. To what extent then can the GAT framework
of rules be the basis for the creation of an antitrust policy?
A. GATT and the Regulation of International Trade
The promotion of competition is an integral part of the GATT
liberal international free trade system that emerged in the aftermath
of World War II. Though the GATT" itself neither defines competi-
tion nor states that its objective is to promote competition, it is possi-
ble to infer this from two factors: (1) the circumstances surrounding
the creation of the GATI, and (2) its specific objectives as seen in its
rules and principles.
After World War II there was a generally held view that mistakes
in economic policy, particularly protectionism and trade discrimina-
tion, had been a major cause of the depression that preceded the
second world war.13' Thus, protectionism was deemed to be inimi-
cal to global welfare. The aim of the contracting parties to the
GATT was to create a body of rules to govern international trade
which would outlaw all discriminatory practices.' 3 2
Discrimination in international trade implies the application of
dissimilar conditions and requirements to equivalent transactions, so
as to bestow on one party a competitive advantage over another
party. This distorts the GATT objective of promoting competition
between the contracting parties. As the preamble of GATT states,
the aim of the contracting parties is to "[enter] into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to a substantial reduc-
tion of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment." Thus, the principles of reciprocity and
non-discrimination, which inform the regulatory framework of the
GATT, are the basic guarantees of the unrestricted competition re-
quired by the free trade system.
131 J. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 9.
132 M. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 103 (1987).
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The GAIT does not purport, however, to establish perfect com-
petition. The goal is rather workable competition- competition
that is effective in practice. Thus the GATT distinguishes between
two kinds of trade barriers that could distort competition: tariffs and
nontariff barriers. While the GATT permits the use of the customs
tariff as a means of protecting local industries, it works against the
use of all other forms of nontariff barriers to international trade.
The GAIT is committed to the notion that tariffs are the only
appropriate means of protection, but it is also committed to their
progressive reduction. Tariff reductions take place through negotia-
tions conducted in accordance with the established GATT rules.' 33
Through these negotiations, GAIT attempts to minimize the extent
to which the contracting parties can apply discriminatory measures
in the market. This is to ensure, among other things, that there is
unrestricted access to markets, that the changes in supply and de-
mand are reflected in the prices of contracting party products, and
that the sale of products reflects responses to the market and not
artificial restrictions.
TRIMs, which may influence the location of economic activity,
are arguably to be regarded as nontariff barriers illegal under the
GATT.13 4 It is clear, however, that the monopolistic practices, mar-
ket allocation strategies, and market dominance of MNEs also affect
the promotion of competition in international trade. Because the
GAIT has only dealt with the activities of states, the practices of
MNEs have escaped scrutiny. An examination of the principles and
rules of the GATT reveals, however, that they can be made applica-
ble to the conduct of investment by MNEs as well as by states.
1. International Trade and the Most Favored Nation Principle
The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle is the cornerstone of
the GATT regulatory framework. Thus, according to article I:l,
"any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for another
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties."' 3 5
The MFN principle is evident in other provisions as well. Ac-
cording to article III, for example, the contracting parties agree to
grant to each other "treatment no less favorable"' 36 than that
granted to any other contracting party. The principle also affects the
133 For the procedures for tariff negotiations, see General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXVIII, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
308 (hereinafter GATT].
134 See McCulloch & Owen, supra note 63, at 347.
135 TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 2 (1986).
136 GAIT, art. III:4, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 308; see also
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treatment of tariff concessions under article II, according to which
each contracting party is obliged to grant to other contracting parties
treatment no less favorable than that stipulated in the appropriate
part of the appropriate tariff schedule annexed to the General
Agreement.
The objective of the MFN provisions clearly is to prevent dis-
criminatory treatment that would impede competition in interna-
tional trade. Despite this objective, however, the GATT envisages
certain exceptions to the MFN principle. These include the use of
customs unions and free trade areas (article XXIV); measures to
counter dumping (article XVI); the modification of concessions (arti-
cle XX); national security (article XXI); the suspension and waiver of
GATT obligations (articles XXIII and XXV); and the maintenance of
the preferences that existed at the time of the GATT's creation (arti-
cle 1:2).
2. International Trade and National Treatment
The effect of tariff concessions could be negated by the use of
internal quantitative regulations and taxes.' 37 Thus, article III of
the General Agreement is designed to protect the agreed tariff con-
cessions from nullification or negation by the use of internal taxes
and regulations.' 38 In this way the GATT eliminates the possibility
that internal taxes could be used to place contracting parties at a
competitive disadvantage. A second way in which article III en-
hances nondiscriminatory treatment is in stipulating that all con-
tracting parties accord national treatment to the imported products
of other contracting parties.' 39 This provides an obstacle to the use
of internal legislative and administrative measures to protect domes-
tic industry.
TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 6 (1986); K. SIMMONDS & B.
HILL, supra note 15, at 8.
157 Under the GATT, once tariff concessions have been negotiated, they are bound
against increase by being recorded in schedules annexed to the General Agreement. Such
tariff concessions are then extended to all participants under the most favored nation prin-
ciple. It is evident that the imposition of any internal taxes on the products of a
counterparty, once such concessions have been made, may have the effect of negating such
tariff concessions.
138 Article III in part states that "[tihe products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of another contracting party shall not be subject, directly
or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those
applied ... to like domestic products." See TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT, supra note
135, at 6; K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 7.
139 Article III additionally provides that "the products of the territories of any con-
tracting party ... shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use." GATT,
art. III, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 308.
1991] 335
N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com. REG.
In Italian Discrimination Against Agricultural Machinery,140 the
GATT Conciliation Panel clearly stated that the objective of the na-
tional treatment provision is to promote competition. The case in-
volved a dispute between the governments of Italy and the United
Kingdom concerning the grant of favorable credit facilities to the
purchasers of Italian agricultural machinery. The United Kingdom
argued that Italy's provision of credit facilities to purchasers of Ital-
ian-made machinery was contrary to article III.
The Italian government defended its practice by stating that ar-
ticle III could not be interpreted to limit the rights of the contracting
parties to formulate domestic policies in a manner unforeseen when
the contracting parties signed the agreement because such interfer-
ence with domestic policies was not intended by the drafters of the
General Agreement. The panel, however, was of the opinion that
the drafters intended to embrace not only laws and regulations that
directly governed the sale and purchase of imported goods, but also
any laws and regulations that might modify the conditions of compe-
tition between imported and domestic goods on the market.' 4 1
Thus, the panel supported the view that the objective behind the na-
tional treatment provision is to prevent the discriminatory use of in-
ternal regulations to limit imports.
3. International Trade and Quantitative Restrictions
Another impediment to competition is quantitative restrictions.
The opposition to quantitative restrictions is based on the fact that
international trade becomes dependent upon government-mandated
policies or arbitrary decisions rather than on the operation of market
forces and economic considerations such as price, availability, and
quality of the product. The use of quantitative restrictions effectively
blocks the operation of the price mechanism and hampers the opera-
tion of the international market system. Quantitative restrictions
also are anticompetitive to the extent that they artificially establish
demand patterns that discriminate among the various sources of
supply.
The desire to prevent the use of quantitative restrictions in or-
der to facilitate competition is evident in the fact that, even though
their use is permitted in certain situations under article XI:2,142 con-
140 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agrctdfural Machinery, U.N. Doc. LU8 3 3 , 7
GAIT BISD Supp. 60 (1959).
141 Id. at 64.
142 TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT, supra note 135, at 17; K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL,
I THE LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER GATT 23-24. Some of these situations may be included
under article XI:2.
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or re-
lieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other [essential] products ...
(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the applica-
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tracting parties still have the obligation to administer quantitative re-
strictions in a nondiscriminatory manner. 143 Thus, contracting
parties may apply no prohibition or restriction on the importation of
any product from the territory of another contracting party unless
the importation of like products from all other contracting parties is
similarly prohibited or restricted. The objective of this requirement
is to maintain a level playing field for all contracting parties.
4. International Trade and Antidumping and Countervailing
Duties
The GATT provisions on antidumping and countervailing du-
ties aim at the rectification of distorted competition caused by gov-
ernment dumping and subsidization. The provisions on
antidumping and countervailing duties are found in article VI of the
General Agreement and should be considered together with the pro-
visions on subsidies in article VI.
Generally, dumping involves price discrimination between sepa-
rate national markets.. It has been defined as "the selling of goods in
an external market, at less than the comparable price for which they
are sold in the internal market of the exporter."'144 Thus, goods are
dumped when the normal value of the goods exceeds the export
price.
GATT condemns the use of injurious dumping. In the event
that dumping leads to injury, or threatens material injury, to an es-
tablished industry in the importing country, the injured importing
country is permitted to impose a duty on the imported goods. This
retaliatory duty is referred to as an antidumping duty. The an-
tidumping duty equals the difference between the higher normal
value of the goods and the deflated import price.
Countervailing duties are imposed in cases of subsidization.
Although the General Agreement does not define a subsidy, the term
could be said to include "any financial or other benefit that has ac-
crued or will accrue directly or indirectly to persons engaged in the
production, manufacture.., export or import of goods as a result of
a scheme, program, practice or things done, provided or imple-
mented by the government of the country."' 145 Although the GATT
tolerates the use of production and export subsidies on primary
tion of standards or regulations or regulations for the classification . . . of
commodities...
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in
any form necessary to the fisheries product, imported in any form necessary
to the enforcement of governmental measures ....
143 GATT, art. XIII, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 308.
144 J. CASTEL, A. DE MESTRAL, & W. GRAHAM, INTERNATIONAL BusINESs TRANSACTIONS
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 249 (1986).
145 Id.
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products, 146 it is strictly opposed to the use of export subsidies on
nonprimary products. 47 Where subsidization of nonprimary prod-
ucts causes or threatens material injury, the injured contracting party
is entitled to impose countervailing duties in an amount equal to the
amount of the subsidization.
The GATT recognizes, however, that although the use of coun-
tervailing duties and antidumping duties is necessary to rectify dis-
torted competition, such duties could themselves be used for
anticompetitive purposes such as protecting local markets and indus-
tries.' 48 This practice would most likely be used against low cost
producers considered to be a threat to local industry. Thus, the use
of antidumping and countervailing duty measures is carefully con-
trolled by the provisions in the General Agreement and the Subsi-
dies Code of the Tokyo Round, which attempts to provide an
interpretation of the GATT provisions on subsidies and counter-
vailing duties. ' 49 Although these principles are equally applicable to
the activities of MNEs, they have only been applied to states.
V. GAIT and Restrictive Business Practices
The possibility that some business practices of multinational en-
terprises could frustrate GATT objectives of promoting competition
and development was raised by some contracting parties in the late
1950s. In a 1958 resolution, 50 the contracting parties recognized
that "the activities of international cartels and trusts may hamper the
expansion of world trade and economic development in individual
countries and thereby frustrate the benefits of tariff reductions and
the removal of quantitative restrictions or otherwise interfere with
the objectives of the General Agreement." 15' The contracting par-
ties then appointed a Group of Experts to study and make recom-
mendations with regard to whether and to what extent they should
146 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 36; TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT,
supra note 135, at 26.
147 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 37; TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT,
supra note 135, at 27.
148 The possibility that antidumping duties could be used to restrict competition in
the form of imports from low cost producers arose in an early GATT case. Swedish Anti-
Dumping Duties, U.N. Doc. LU328, 3 GATT BISD Supp. 81 (1955) (hereinafter "the Swed-
ish Case").
149 Under the General Agreement, both antidumping and countervailing duties can
only be used when the dumping or subsidization causes or threatens material injury. It
must be proved that the injury suffered by an established industry is not the result of other
factors. Furthermore, the right to apply antidumping duties only arises in the case of price
dumping, where the lower export price is the result of manipulation by the exporting
country. This seems to follow from the definition of normal value, which is based on the
commercial or consumer price in the exporting country or, in the absence of such a price,
the cost of production. See GAT, art. VI(a), (b), 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 308.
150 Resolution of Nov. 5, 1958, 7th GATT BISD Supp. 29 (1959).
151 Id.
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deal with the problem of the restrictive business practices of MNEs.
The Group of Experts submitted its report, which included the views
of both the majority and the minority, at the end of 1959:152
The majority' 53 found that it was unrealistic to recommend, at
that point in time, a multilateral agreement for the control of restric-
tive business practices that had effects on trade, because the neces-
sary consensus needed to implement such an agreement did not
exist. 154 Moreover, countries did not possess adequate experience
in the area to devise an effective control procedure. 155 The majority
argued that a multilateral agreement could only operate effectively if
a sufficient number of contracting parties had powers to act against
international restrictive business practices or were able and willing to
adopt such powers, unless the agreement incorporated a supra-na-
tional body with broad powers of investigation and control. 156 In
addition, countries could only be equipped to adopt legislation relat-
ing to international restrictive business practices when they had dealt
with the problem on a domestic level.' 5 7 On the basis of these find-
ings the majority recommended that there be a process of consulta-
tion between the party affected by the use of international restrictive
business practices and the other contracting party. The latter was to
accord "sympathetic consideration"' 58 and should "afford adequate
opportunity for consultation with a view to arriving at a mutually sat-
isfactory conclusion."' 59
The minority, 160 although agreeing in principle with the views
of the majority, differed in certain fundamental respects. They ar-
gued that, although consultation was important, additional provi-
sions were needed because the initial consultations would probably
fail due to disparities in bargaining power between the parties.' 6 '
The minority argued that, in the event that initial consultations
failed, there should be an independent group of experts, appointed
by the contracting parties, who would participate in renewed consul-
tations. Although dealing with international restrictive business
practices would require an amendment of the General Agreement,
the minority agreed that it was "imperative that some initial meas-
ures be taken to counteract restrictive business practices having
152 See Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations 9 GATT BISD Supp. 170
(1961) (report adopted on June 2, 1960).
153 The majority consisted of experts from Austria, Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland.
154 9 GATF BISD Supp. at 171.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 181-82.
158 Id. at 174.
159 Id.
160 The minority was made up of Danish, French, Norwegian, and Swedish experts.
161 GATT BISD Supp. at 174.
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harmful effects on trade between contracting parties or otherwise in-
terfering with the objectives of the General Agreement."1 62 The mi-
nority added that:
the contention by the majority that the control of [international] re-
strictive business practices (having a harmful effect on trade]
through the General Agreement would not be practicable unless a
sufficient number of countries had adopted national legislation for
dealing with such practices on the domestic plane could not be
accepted. 163
The minority drew a distinction between two kinds of national
legislation. On the one hand, there was the legislation that provided
for the control of cartels and trusts operatingon the domestic market
and that had as its objective the protection of the country concerned.
On the other hand, there was the national legislation designed "to
protect other countries against the harmful restrictive business prac-
tices applied by cartels or trusts within thejurisdiction of the legislat-
ing country."' 164 This second form of legislation was the type
needed to prevent the objectives of the GATT from being frustrated.
The minority found that "such legislation would be enacted and ap-
plied only in accordance with an international agreement, imposing
corresponding obligations on all participant countries, in order to
establish cooperation in this field."' 165 The minority view indicates
that: (1) the use of national legislation in accordance with multilater-
ally accepted standards and obligations is a means of regulating the
conduct of investment under the GAIT; and (2) the relevant multi-
lateral standards can be found in the GAIT.
A. The GA TT and the Regulation of International Investment
1. The Principle of Nondiscrimination and the Regulation of
Investment
It has been argued above that the principle of nondiscrimination
is the basic guarantee of competition in the liberal international trad-
ing system. This is because the principle of nondiscrimination seeks
to prevent the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions in a manner that would place one party at a competitive
disadvantage to another, thus enabling participants in the market to
influence the workings of the market and restrict trade. This princi-
ple of nondiscrimination governs the notion of access to markets and
is embodied in such GATT provisions as articles III, XIII, and XVII.
Article XVII, although concerned with the nondiscriminatory
use of state trading enterprises, is also relevant for the consideration
of the discriminatory measures adopted by private firms. The provi-
162 Id. at 186.
163 Id. at 178.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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sion states that any enterprise established by a contracting party or
granted exclusive privileges by a contracting party "shall act in a
manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory
treatment."' 66 The definition of nondiscriminatory treatment with
respect to the practices of such enterprises includes making sales and
purchases "solely in accordance with commercial considerations, in-
cluding price, quality, availability, marketability.., and shall afford the
enterprises of other contracting parties adequate opportunity ... to compete for
participation in such purchases and sales."
Article XVII was interpreted by the FIRA panel.' 6 7 The United
States argued that the undertakings that the administration of the
Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) required investors to make
prevented investors from acting solely in accordance with commer-
cial considerations, contrary to article XVII:1.168 Canada argued
that the stipulations of article XVII were only relevant to the issue of
state trading. Furthermore, according to Canada, the provisions de-
fined the most favored nation obligation with respect to the relation-
ship of a contracting party to the state trading enterprise, or to any
enterprise granted exclusive privileges by the contracting party as
defined in subparagraph (a). 169 This did not imply any additional
obligations on the part of the contracting party not to impose certain
requirements on foreign investors. The panel was of the opinion
that, by referring to subparagraph (a), subparagraph (c) imposed on
contracting parties "the obligation to act in their relationship with
state trading enterprises and other enterprises in a -manner consis-
tent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment pre-
scribed in the agreement for governmental measures affecting
imports and exports by private traders."' 70
Although it is conceded that the provision refers to the activities
of state trading enterprises, there seems to be no reason why the
nondiscriminatory practices in subparagraph (b) cannot be made ap-
plicable to the activities of MNEs. Despite the fact that the GATT
undertakings are governmental, the same contracting parties could
undertake to prevent enterprises incorporated in their territories
from acting otherwise than in accordance with commercial consider-
ations. Moreover, due to the MNE's dominant role in international
trade and pervasive market power, it is probable that it is the activi-
ties of multinationals, and not state trading enterprises, that will not
166 GATT, art. XVII:I(a), 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 308.
167 FIRA Panel Report, supra note 72, 30 GATT BISD Supp. 140 (1986) (report of the
panel adopted on Feb. 7, 1985).
168 Paragraph (c) states in its relevant parts that "[n]o contracting party shall prevent
any enterprise (whether or not an enterprise described in sub paragraph (a)... ) under its
jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the principles of sub paragraph (a) and (b) of
this paragraph."
169 30 GATT BISD Supp. at 153.
170 d. at 163.
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be in accordance with "commercial considerations" and that will not
"afford the enterprises of other contracting parties, adequate oppor-
tunity to compete." In addition, it is arguable that because state
trading enterprises from developed nations have become increas-
ingly transnational, the old distinction between state trading enter-
prises and MNEs has been blurred.
Article XVII, if applied to the activities of MNEs, would outlaw
the use of such practices as tied sales, vertical arrangements between
parent and subsidiary, and other integration strategies and methods
of substantive control that influence the workings of the market and
constitute forms of discrimination. 17 1 It is perfectly arguable that
practices that are inconsistent with the principles of the GATT
should not be allowed in the case of certain enterprises on the
grounds that they are private enterprises. The objective behind arti-
cle XVII is not to limit the means by which the practices are perpe-
trated, but to prevent the result-the restriction of competition.
Both kinds of enterprises restrict competition through the use of
such activities, so it should make no difference whether the enter-
prise is a state trading enterprise or a multinational enterprise.
The conclusion that GAI principles should be applied equally
to activities of private MNEs is suggested by the Japan-Trade in Semi-
conductors Case.' 72 At issue in the case was an arrangement between
the governments of Japan and the United States relating to trade in
semiconductors. The arrangement sought to expand the market
share of U.S. semiconductor firms in Japan and to prevent the dump-
ing of Japanese semiconductors in third country markets other than
the United States.' 73 This arrangement was the result of several in-
dustry complaints about the Japanese market structure for semicon-
ductor trade and the dumping of semiconductors in the United
States and of threats of section 301 proceedings against Japan. 174
171 Vertical arrangements essentially involve the use of integration strategies and the
centralized control of MNE activity by the parent to meet the objectives of the global MNE
effort. See Y. Doz, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES (1972) (for a
discussion of vertical arrangements and MNE integration strategies); see also C. PRALAHAD
& Y. Doz, THE MULTINATIONAL MISSION (1987). "Tied sales" refers to the process
whereby the transfer of technology by the MNE to the host country is made conditional on
the host country purchasing other inputs, which may be either unnecessary to the func-
tioning of the technology transferred or can be procured more cheaply elsewhere. Id. See
U. ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971);
Helleiner, The Role of the Multinational Corporation in the Less Developed Countries' Trade in Tech-
nology, 3 WORLD DEV. 161 (1975) (discussion of the use of tied sales and other transfer of
technology strategies).
172 U.N. Doc. L/6309, 35 GATT BISD Supp. 116 (report of the panel adopted on May
4, 1988) (hereinafter Semiconductor Case).
173 Hirsch, Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United
States of America concerning Trade in Semi-Conductor Products, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 175 (1987).
174 See Long, The US-Japan Semiconductor Dispute: Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, 13 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1-37 (1988); Kingery, The US-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement and the
GAT: Operating in a Legal Vacuum, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 467-97 (1989).
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The U.S.-Japan arrangement contained three sections addressing ac-
cess to markets, dumping by Japanese producers, and general en-
forcement.' 75  The agreement provided for a third country
monitoring system that consisted of an administrative structure to
monitor the costs and export prices of the products ofJapanese firms
to prevent dumping in third countries and the United States.' 76 In
addition, each Japanese exporter was to report data on its sales to
the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),
which was to monitor the costs and export prices of the products
exported to third countries.177
The objection raised by the EEC and other interested third par-
ties was that the arrangement between the United States and Japan
amounted to a collusion between the dominant producers of semi-
conductors to manage world trade in semiconductors in a manner
inimical to the promotion of competition. 78 The EEC alleged spe-
cifically that:
the benefits accruing to it from the general agreement were being
nullified or impaired by the very nature of certain provisions of the
arrangement between Japan and the United States which constituted
an unacceptable interference with the trade in and production of
semiconductors of contracting parties not party to the Arrangement.
Some of the measures also introduced were upsetting international
COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIPS unilaterally and artificially .... 179
It was also argued that the third country monitoring system was not a
mere passive operation but was intended to restrict the production
of semiconductors, and the exports of semiconductors into third
countries, through the issuance of export licenses that fixed mini-
mum prices, in contravention of article XI of the GATT.
Because the United States and Japan occupied a large propor-
tion of the world trade in semiconductors, the government-deter-
mined export price controls could effectively compel importing
countries to purchase at prices far in excess of what they would pay
in a competitive situation. The effect of the arrangement thus would
be to bestow on the Japanese firms a great deal of competitive advan-
tage over other producers and users of semiconductors, because the
monitoring system would induce the Japanese firms to wield export
limitations, subjecting other competitors to risk and uncertainty.
Competition would effectively be outlawed.18 0
The EEC contended that not only was the third country moni-
toring system contrary to the essence of the free trade system, it was
175 Hirsch, supra note 173, at 177.
176 Id. at 118.
177 Id. at 180.
178 The other interested parties who submitted opinions were Australia, Canada,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Brazil.
179 See Semiconductor Case, supra note 172, at 123.
180 This opinion was shared by Australia. Id. at 145.
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also inconsistent with the obligations of Japan under article VI of the
GATT.18 1 An exporting country, under that provision, may not pur-
port to prevent dumping because, unless antidumping measures are
taken only by the importing country, they could be a means of price
abuse.' 8 2 Japan, however, argued that article VI did not bestow on
importing countries an exclusive right to rectify dumping.18 3
The EEC also argued that the arrangement was contrary to arti-
cle XI, concerning export restriction. The panel, in considering the
legality of the arrangement under article XI,'l 4 noted that the provi-
sion was comprehensive and extended to all measures, other than
taxes or duties, aimed at the restriction of importation or exporta-
tion and that this could prima facie include the Japanese meas-
ures.' 8 5 Moreover, according to the panel, the measures did not
have to be legally binding to be effective. All that was needed was
the provision of sufficient incentives and disincentives to make the
Japanese producers comply with the requirements.)8 6 The panel
concluded that:
[A]n administrative structure had been created by the government
of Japan which operated to exert... pressure on the private sector
to cease exporting at prices below company specific costs .... [T]he
complex of measures exhibited the rationale as well as the essential
elements of a formal system of export control . . . the absence of
formally legally binding obligations [being more of] form rather
than substance. 18 7
The third country monitoring system, to the extent that it consti-
tuted a coherent system of measures aimed at restricting the export
of semiconductors to third countries, was thus inconsistent with arti-
cle XI of the GATT.18 8
Although the semiconductor case involved an agreement be-
tween two contracting parties, the arrangement was intended to in-
fluence the activities of the Japanese private firms engaged in the
semiconductor trade. For this reason, the case is relevant to the con-
sideration of the principle of nondiscrimination with respect to the
investment activities of private firms. For instance, it was argued by
the EEC that the arrangement between the two contracting parties
would bestow a great competitive advantage on the Japanese firms in
two respects.
First, the stipulation of minimum prices for semiconductors
would induce if not compel the Japanese firms to exercise quantita-
il This opinion was shared by Canada. Id., § 88, at 147.
182 Id., § 43, at 128.
183 Id., § 45, at 129.
184 Id., § 104, at 153.
185 Id., § 106, at 153-54.
186 Id., § 111, at 155.
187 Id. at 157-58.
188 Id.
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tive export limitations. This would cause a shortage of supply, an
increase in prices, and uncertainty for those producers who relied on
semiconductors as intermediate products. 18 9 Second, the domestic
prices of semiconductors set by the firms remained far below the
government stipulated export prices, compelling importers to
purchase inputs at higher prices. The arrangement amounted there-
fore to a collusion between the giants of the semiconductor trade to
reduce exports in order to increase prices at which the goods were
exported. The systematic monitoring of company and product spe-
cific costs directly influenced the behavior of the Japanese firms, with
the effect of restricting the sale for export of semiconductors below
company specific costs to markets other than the United States.
Two issues were thus addressed by the panel in the semiconduc-
tor case: (1) the legality of the measures themselves; and (2) the dis-
criminatory effect of those measures, when implemented by the
private semiconductor firms, on the process of international invest-
ment. Because the measures were a direct influence on the Japanese
firms and prompted them to resort to discriminatory and restrictive
practices, the case provides persuasive authority for the assertion
that the practices of multinational enterprises themselves are amena-
ble to the principles of the GATT.
2. The Principle of Transparency and the Regulation of
Investment
The principle of transparency is an integral part of the interna-
tional trading system and is embodied in various procedures for con-
sultation and notification. 190 The objective behind the principle of
transparency is to ensure that the use of certain trading measures is
under the scrutiny of the contracting parties and that the contracting
parties have advance knowledge of trade opportunities and any rele-
vant information which respect to trade. The principle of trans-
parency thus provides a measure of certainty in the trade
relationships between contracting parties.
The GATT principle of transparency, however, has so far only
been applied to the tariffs and nontariff procedures between states,
with the result that there is no transparency in the trading system
associated with the activities of the MNE. The fact that a predomi-
nant portion of international trade consists of intrafirm transactions,
and the fact that the same MNEs control the prices of certain goods,
introduces a level of uncertainty into international trade.19'
The enterprise in the process of international production inter-
nalizes production through the integration of finance, research and
189 Id. § 34, at 124.
190 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 55-57.
191 Helleiner, supra note 117, at 369-75.
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development, and production. 192 The MNE also makes use of in-
trafirm transactions and transfers. 193 The objective of these strate-
gies is the reduction of loss and the utilization of economies of scale.
The problem with the use of these strategies is that they create oligo-
polistic market structures that conflict with the goal of transparency
in international trade.
Intrafirm transactions are not easily monitored. One aspect of
the MNE is the control of marketing channels, which allows it to en-
gage in price discrimination. The result of such discrimination is un-
certainty in the international trading system.
Because the principle of transparency is one of the means
through which the GAT seeks to achieve unrestricted and undis-
torted international competition, and since the nontransparency of
the MNE enhances its ability to engage in anticompetitive practices
to the detriment of the international trading system, the principle of
transparency should be applied to the activities of MNEs.
3. Nullification and Impairment and the Regulation of
Investment
Article XXIII of the GATT provides that the benefits accruing to
a contracting party could be negated or nullified and impaired as a
result of "the application by another contracting party of any mea-
sure whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this agreement,
or . . . the existence of any other situation."'194 The statement that the
benefits of a contracting party could be nullified and impaired by the
activities of other contracting parties or "any other situation" is suffi-
ciently broad to embrace the activities of the MNE. It is submitted
that, just as any government-imposed investment measure that im-
pedes competition is considered to be a nullification of the benefits
of a contracting party, the anticompetitive activities of the MNE also
should be brought under the GAT.
MNE activities should be governed by the GAIT because such
activities-including the use of global integration strategies, restric-
tions on competition clauses, tied sales, and price fixing-prevent
the efficient allocation of the benefits of international trade and in-
vestment among the contracting parties. Because these measures re-
sult in a contracting party's inability to compete on equal terms in
the international trading system, they nullify and impair the benefits
that accrue under the GATT. Furthermore, based on precedents
such as the semiconductor case, the aim of the GAT to promote
192 C. PRALAHAD & Y. Doz, supra note 116; Y. Doz, supra note 116 (on the use of inte-
gration strategies by MNEs to achieve competitive advantage).
193 Rotstein, supra note I 11, at 184-92 (on the internal relations between parent and
subsidiary firms and affiliates being inimical to the liberal system).
194 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 55-56.
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competition among the contracting parties can serve as the basis for
a framework of rules to regulate the conduct of investment.
The above argument implies that any government-imposed in-
vestment measure that impedes competition or "the existence of any
other situation," such as MNE activity, which prevents the efficient
allocation of the benefits of international trade and investment
among the contracting parties, and results in a contracting party's
inability to compete on equal terms in the international trading sys-
tem, are both prima facie a nullification and impairment of the bene-
fits which accrue under the GATT. The measures used by investors,
such as restrictions on competition clauses, tied sales, and price fix-
ing, are all then prima facie illegal under the GAIT. This establishes
that many activities of the MNE are inconsistent with the GATT and
that the principles of the GATT can be applied to them.
If GATT principles are to be extended to the use of TRIMs be-
cause they are trade distorting, the same principles should also be
made applicable to the operations of the firms engaged in interna-
tional trade and investment. However, because the provisions of the
GATT, under the Protocol of Provisional Application, 195 apply only
to inter-state activities, it is likely that some contracting parties will
deem them inapplicable to the MNE unless the contracting parties
adopt an antitrust policy or a framework of rules expressly applicable
to the performance of international investment. An important issue
to be addressed in establishing a GATT framework for investment
will be the question of a rule-oriented approach.
Conclusion
The recent efforts to extend the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to investment, services, and intellectual property involve
the creation of a free and liberal trade regime in investment. To a
large extent, the basis of this effort can be found in orthodox free
trade theory.196 The implication is that an unfettered flow of factors
of production, goods, and services across national boundaries will
promote the efficient allocation of resources for mutual benefit.
Consistent with this approach is the fact that the GATT prohibits
some government intervention that affects the activities of private
firms.
The GATT draws a distinction between tariffs and nontariff bar-
riers to trade, and only permits the use of tariffs. Because of the
increased role of the multinational enterprise in international trade
and investment, however, the use of TRIMs may have the same effect
as the use of a nontariff barrier and thus may influence the import
and export decisions of investors. Because this constitutes a distor-
195 Protocol of Provisional Application, October 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1950).
196 K. SIMMONDS & B. HILL, supra note 15, at 62.
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tion of international trade, the use of TRIMs is theoretically GATT-
illegal.
As has been shown above, applying GATT principles to TRIMs,
while leaving MNE activity outside the GATT's scope, ignores the
role of private economic power in international trade and invest-
ment. The real issue at stake for the Uruguay Round negotiations is
the implication for global development of a policy which relies on
the practices of the MNEs for the efficient allocation of world re-
sources. While this does not imply an aversion to multinational en-
terprises and the liberalization of investment per se, the practices of
these enterprises, and the inability of the weaker contracting parties
to counterbalance the use of MNE market power, is a legitimate
cause for concern. This perhaps justifies the developing countries'
opposition to the inclusion of investment in the current round of ne-
gotiations. For such contracting parties, the present structure of in-
ternational trade and investment, which depends on market forces
dominated by the multinational enterprises, will not promote the ef-
ficient allocation of global wealth for development.
While the negotiations to link policies on investment with those
on trade should be applauded as an attempt by GATT to move with
the times, the GATT objective of efficient allocation of resources
cannot be achieved merely by promoting a liberalization of invest-
ment. The challenge for any negotiations on extending the GATT to
investment is to provide for a comprehensive examination and re-
view by the international community of the fundamental issues of the
international trading system and other areas of the international
economy that impact on trading activity, such as the activities of
MNEs. Negotiations should establish a framework of rules to govern
the conduct of both MNEs and states in international trade and in-
vestment. The emphasis of such a body of rules should be on the
promotion of global economic development as well as liberalization.
The problems of developing countries that give rise to their use
of TRIMs cannot be addressed merely by the liberalization of invest-
ment followed by the granting of differential treatment.1 97 As a re-
port of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) notes:
differential and more favorable treatment became necessary because(a) the post-war multilateral system had been drawn up without de-
velopment as a major objective and (b) the consensus in favour of
trade actions to stimulate development was not strong enough to
obtain a meaningful reform of the system itself. The incomplete in-
tegration of developing countries within the trading system arises
from the failure of the system to adapt to the challenge of develop-
ment and not in the unwillingness of developing countries to adapt
197 Id. at 63.
[VOL. 16
GATT AND INVESTMENT
to the system. 19
8
Granting differential and more favorable treatment in the context of
a liberalization of investment will not on its own obviate the
problems which give rise to the use of trade related investment meas-
ures. The approach that the Uruguay Round adopted on the issue of
TRIMs thus has left much to be desired. The macroscopic approach
of the GATT, which considers only the trade distorting activities of
states, needs to be supplemented by a microscopic approach that
also would consider the activities of the MNE.
198 Id. at 145.
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